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HURDLING NEW PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES
IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
Disparate impact plaintiffs face formidable evidentiary requirements after the
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.1 In confirming the
application of subjective as well as objective employment criteria to disparate im-
pact analysis,2 the Atonio Court shifted the burden of proof used in such analysis.
The plaintiff must now carry the ultimate burden of persuasion.3 This note will
explain the difference between the burden of production and the burden of persua-
sion and the Court's application of these burdens to disparate impact cases. This
note will examine how the decision in Atonio has undermined the very purpose of
Title VII and moved employment discrimination law a significant step backward.
II. FACTS
In 1974, respondents, Filipino and Alaska Native cannery workers at petition-
ers' Alaskan salmon canneries,' brought a class action under Title VII5 alleging
both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of Title VII liability.6 The
petitioners were two companies that operate salmon canneries in "remote and
widely separated areas of Alaska."7 The canneries only operate during the sum-
mer months when the salmon runs occur and are closed, winterized, and vacated
during the rest of the year.8 Therefore, the workers who operate the cannery facii-
ties are hired for only as long as there are salmon to can. 9 Since the operations are
located in remote regions, cannery workers are housed and fed at the canneries.°
1. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
2. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank& Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). Watson was the first Supreme Court case to
hold that disparate impact theory applies equally to "subjective" employment criteria as well as to "objective" em-
ployment criteria.
Cases prior to Watson followed the standard set forth by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
which was the first case to apply disparate impact analysis and limited its application to "objective" employment
criteria. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
3. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
4. Id. at2119-20.
5.42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
6. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2120. Plaintiffs may raise claims under Title VII using either the theory of disparate
impact or disparate treatment, or both. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n. 15 (1977). For a discussion of the difference between these two theories, see also infra notes 97-101 and ac-
companying text.
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The cannery companies employ workers to fill both unskilled positions and
skilled positions.1 The unskilled positions are the "cannery jobs" on the cannery
lines, which are filled predominantly by Filipinos and Alaska Natives (of which
the respondents are members). 12 Noncannery jobs are classified as skilled work-
ers13 and are filled with predominantly white workers. 14 These jobs pay more than
the unskilled cannery worker jobs."
Respondents alleged that a variety of petitioners' hiring and promotion prac-
tices16 had prevented nonwhites, including themselves, from being employed as
noncannery workers. They alleged that racial discrimination was the reason be-
hind the "racial stratification" of the work force.17 Since cannery workers and non-
cannery workers live and eat in separate facilities, respondents also complained
that this practice was advanced for racial segregation. 
18
Respondents brought their claims under both disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington rejected all of the disparate treatment claims. It also rejected the dis-
parate impact claims; those that involved subjective criteria were not allowed un-
der the interpretation of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,1 and those that'involved
objective criteria were rejected for failure of proof.2"
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sitting as a panel af-
firmed the district court's decision.21 The court held that subjective decision-mak-
ing lent itself to far better scrutiny under a disparate treatment theory.22 However,
the court of appeals agreed to hear the case en banc23 to settle the controversy of
whether or not subjective as well as objective criteria could be used in a disparate
impact case.24 The en banc court vacated the panel's decision, reversed the district
court's holding, and remanded the case to a panel for reconsideration in light of the
11. Id.
12. Id. at2119-20.
13. Id. at 2119. Noncannery jobs were described by the court of appeals as machinists, engineers, quality
control personnel, crew to operate vessels, cooks, carpenters, store-keepers, bookkeepers, etc. Id. at 2119 n.3.
See also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F2d. 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2119.
15. Id. at 2119-20.
16. Id. at 2120. The hiring and promoting practices included:
nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels [because the
Filipinos were hired through a union, the Alaska Natives were hired locally since they reside in villages
near the canneries, and the noncannery positions were hired from the cannery companies' Washington
and Oregon offices], [and] a practice of not promoting from within. ...
Id. at 2119-20.
17. Id. at 2120.
18. Id.
19.401 U.S. 424 (1971).
20. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2117.
21. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985).
22. Id. at 1133.




new decision which held that disparate impact analysis could be applied to subjec-
tive employment criteria if the plaintiff proved that a causal connection existed."2
On remand,26 the panel agreed that respondents had made a prima facie case in
accordance with the en banc court's test.27 The panel remanded the case again to
the district court, instructing in detail how the disparate impact analysis was to be
applied and stressing that it was the employer's burden to prove that any disparate
impact caused was justified by business necessity. 8 The court maintained the
shifting of the burden of persuasion in disparate impact cases and confirmed pre-
vious holdings that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff
only in disparate treatment cases."
Since the court of appeals held that respondent had presented a prima facie case
under the disparate impact theory, the petitioner sought review of that decision
and certiorari was granted"° by the Supreme Court in view of Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust Co. , 1 a case in which the Supreme Court had recently wrestled with
the proper application of burdens of proof using the disparate impact theory.32 The
majority decision of Atonio followed the plurality decision of the Watson Court and
imposed new burdens of proof in disparate impact cases.
III. BACKGROUND AND HIsToRY
A. Congressional Goals and Their Interpretations
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.33 Title VII attempts to
provide employees a cause of action against employers who discriminate in their
employment practices."
25. Id. at 1482, 1486. The Ninth Circuit relied on the EEOC guidelines, the language of Title VII, and the
congressional intent behind Title VII to establish a test for a prima facie case. Id. at 1482-83. For discussion of
this test, see infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
26. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987).
27. Id. at 441-42.
28. Id. at 442-43, 450.
29. Id. at 442. The Ninth Circuit drew the distinction between the burdens of persuasion in disparate impact
and disparate treatment theories from Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
30. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 487 U.S. 1232 (1988).
31. 487 U.S. 977.
32. Watson resulted in the Court's being evenly divided on several issues regarding the disparate impact the-
ory.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Section 2000e-2(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
Id.
34. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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The employee's cause of action can be brought under two main theories:35 dis-
parate treatment36 and disparate impact. 7 Using the disparate treatment theory, a
plaintiff alleges that the employer has intentionally discriminated between mem-
bers of different classes. The second theory, disparate impact, refers to the conse-
quences of employment practices rather than the intent.
Although the language of Title VII contains numerous references to the term
"discrimination," the statute does not define the word.38 The Supreme Court has
advanced these two theories and the methods of applying them as a means of inter-
preting the language of Title VII.
B. The 1964 Act
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that it was passed pursuant to the
commerce clause of the Constitution." Congress had two principal goals as the
purpose of Title VII. The primary goal was to prohibit intentional discrimina-
tion,4" but the underlying goal was to "open employment opportunities for Ne-
groes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."41 However,
the terms of Title VII are not limited to discrimination against members of the
black race or of any particular race. This goal of prohibiting intentional discrimi-
nation led to the disparate treatment theory.
Protecting the employer's rights to our free enterprise system while simultane-
ously eliminating discriminatory employment practices was one of Congress'
main concerns.' Critics of Title VII were assured that the legislation would not
place an intolerable burden on employers and would not require an employer to
lower or change job qualifications.' However, no legislative history defines what
kind of burden employers do have to carry as a result of Title VII's enactment. The
35. Two other theories are perpetuation in the present of the effects of past discrimination and failure to make
reasonable accommodation. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1286 n. I (2d ed.
1983).
36. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
38.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1982).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See 110 CONG. REc. 7202-12, 8453-56 (1964). The commerce clause ori-
gins are reflected in Title VII's definitions of "employer," "labor organization," "commerce," and "industry af-
fecting commerce." B. SCH LEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 983 (2d ed. 1983).
40. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15 (" 'Disparate treatment'. . . is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination .... Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it en-
acted Title VII.").
41. 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
42. See supm note 33 for text of § 2000e-2(a).
43. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021
(1981).
44. Id. at 1278.
Whatever its merits as a socially desirable objective, title VII would not require, and no court could read
title VII as requiring, an employer to lower or change the occupational qualifications he sets for his em-
ployees . . . .Title VII says merely that a covered employer cannot refuse to hire someone simply be-
cause of his color ....
Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7246-47 (1964) (remarks of Senator Case)).
A covered employer is an employer with fifteen or more employees. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social
Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
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Supreme Court began its interpretation of this burden with Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.4 and its progeny.
C. The 1972 Amendments
The Supreme Court in Griggs established that a disparate impact caused by ob-
jective employment criteria was violative of Title VII. 46 The Court interpreted
Congress' intent as placing upon the employers the burden of showing a "business
necessity" for the employment practice.47
Congress amended Title VII in 1972" and allowed the courts to continue to en-
force Title VII through private suits or through suits by the EEOC.'" Congress,
thereby, endorsed present court-made interpretations of Title VII.
D. The Disparate Treatment Theory
The two theories of discrimination discussed thus far, disparate treatment and
disparate impact, analyze different types of evidence, and hence, the courts have
established different prima facie cases and burdens of proof for their interpretation
of each theory.
Disparate treatment is the more easily understood type of discrimination. 0
"The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."51 The first case to set out the
order and allocation of the disparate treatment theory was McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green. 2 The case involved a black mechanic who was laid off in the
course of a general work force reduction. 3 The plaintiff-mechanic had partici-
pated in an illegal protest, consisting of a civil rights "stall-in" trespass, against al-
leged racially discriminatory practices of the defendant employer.' The employer
publicly advertised for qualified mechanics about three weeks following the plain-
tiffs activities." The plaintiff applied for reemployment but was rejected by the
employer on the grounds of plaintiffs participation in the illegal conduct.5 6 Plain-
tiff brought suit after the EEOC failed to conciliate the action.5 7 The Supreme
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Id. The objective criteria consisted of requirement of a high school diploma and satisfactory scores on two
aptitude tests.
47. Id. at 431-32. However, no such burden is found in the language of Title VH.
48. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
49. The amendment also provided for a broader definition of religion and extended Title VII to federal and
state employees. Id.
50. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at335 n.15.
51. Id.
52.411 U.S. 792 (1973).
53. Id. at 794.
54. Id. at 794-95.
55. Id. at 796.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 796-97.
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Court granted certiorari5 s and in its decision set forth three standards for establish-
ing a disparate treatment case. 5
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case which includes showing: (1)
that plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) that plaintiff applied and was
qualified for the position; (3) that he was rejected; and (4) that the position re-
mained open, and the employer continued to seek applicants.60 The second part of
the McDonnell Douglas standard is that the defendant must "articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason" for his employment practice.61 This, in effect,
shifts the burden of production to the employer. Exactly what this "articulation"
must consist of was set forth in subsequent cases.62 Finally, McDonnell Douglas
stated that the plaintiff must then show that the reason for the practice was a mere
pretext for the discrimination.63 Therefore, the burden of production shifts back to
the plaintiff. It is important to note that the burden of persuasion always remains
with the plaintiff, and this has been one of the distinguishing features between dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact cases. The Court in McDonnell Douglas,
however, used the term "burden" without reference to either production or persua-
sion, as did the Court in a subsequent case, Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters. 64
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine clarified the burdens in dis-
parate treatment cases." In Burdine a female employee alleged sex discrimination
as the reason she had been denied a promotion and subsequently fired.66 The pro-
motion had gone to a man who, according to the plaintiff, was no better qualified
than she.67 The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding that a Title VII
defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action existed.68 Instead, the
Court held that the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case to create a "presump-
tion" of employment discrimination.69 A presumption is not evidence, but a proce-
dural device which shifts the burden of production to the other party.7" This
burden is shifted to the employer in the second step of the McDonnell Douglas
standards; he need only produce enough evidence to rebut the presumption by
58. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 409 U.S. 1036 (1972).
59. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 798. Since facts vary in Title VII cases, the Court said that the formula is
not always applicable. Id. at 802 n. 13.
60. Id. at 802.
61. Id.
62. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and its progeny. See infra notes 63-
71 and accompanying text.
63. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
64. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). In Furnco the employer articulated that his reason for rejecting three qualified mi-
nority applicants was that he would not consider applicants who were unknown to the job superintendent, and
these applicants were walk-ons. The Supreme Court held that this was a legitimate reason for a hiring decision
because it inferred the applicants were rejected because they were walk-ons and not because they were black.
65. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
66. Id. at 250-51.
67.Id. at 251.
68. Id. at 252.
69. Id. at 254-55.
70. C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 342 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984).
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raising a genuine issue of fact as to whether he discriminated against the plaintiff."'
To satisfy this burden, the defendant must produce "clear and reasonably specific"
evidence." Since the Burdine Court clarified that the ultimate burden of persua-
sion remains with the plaintiff,73 she must follow the final step and show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by the defendant was mere
pretext.
The effect of Burdine was to reduce the evidentiary burden on defendants in dis-
parate treatment cases, thereby making the alternative theory of disparate impact
comparatively more attractive to plaintiffs.
E. The Disparate Impact Theory
The difference in approaching a case from either the disparate treatment or dis-
parate impact theories is important because of the consequences which flow from
this choice. Prior to Atonio, disparate impact provided an easier prima facie case
for the plaintiff than did disparate treatment; and once disparate impact was
shown, the burden shifted to the employer to justify his employment practices as a
"business necessity."74 Disparate impact does not require proof of discriminatory
intent as does disparate treatment,75 and once statistical proof of discrimination is
shown, courts are more likely to find that the defendant-employer discriminated
(as opposed to the disparate treatment prima facie case). In disparate treatment the
plaintiff has the burden of persuasion at all times, and the defendant canjustify his
actions if he has a "legitimate business reason" which is a less oppressive burden
than providing a "business necessity."
76
The seminal case for the disparate impact theory is Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
77
In Griggs the Supreme Court extended Title VII to facially neutral employment
practices which result in an adverse impact on persons of a particular race, na-
tional origin, sex, or religion.78 The employer, Duke Power Company, required
that applicants have a high school diploma or pass two standardized general intelli-
gence tests as a condition of employment .7 The plaintiffs, a group of black appli-
cants, brought the action claiming that these requirements had a discriminatory
effect because they excluded more blacks than whites and an employee could per-
form the job without either of the criteria." The plaintiffs could not establish a
prima facie case under the disparate treatment theory81 because they were not
71. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
72. Id. at 258.
73. Id. at 253.
74. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
75. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
76. See Player, Defining "Legitimacy"in Disparate Treatment Cases: Motivational Inferences as a Talisman for
Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REv. 855, 866-67 (1985).
77. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 426-28.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 5 8-59 and accompanying text.
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"qualified" for the job.82 The Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff can identify
a facially neutral selection criteria or practice and can show that the challenged
criteria or practice has a disproportionately adverse impact on the protected class
of which he is a member, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under
what is termed "disparate impact." 3
A three-part order and allocation of proof was established to bring a claim un-
der this theory. The plaintiff has the burden of proof to set out a prima facie case
and generally does so with statistical evidence.' Once established, the defendant
may rebut the plaintiffs evidence by challenging the statistics. If the plaintiff fails
to establish a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to
prove that the criteria or practice is job-related or justified by some business ne-
cessity.8" The Court stated, "[t]he touchstone is business necessity. If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited."86 However, the Court did not define
"job-related" or "business necessity." These terms were defined by Albemarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody.87
The Albemarle Paper Co. case set the standard for job-relatedness and estab-
lished the third step of the tripartite analysis. If the job-relatedness or business ne-
cessity88 is shown, the plaintiff has an opportunity to surrebut the defendant's
proof. He must show that the employer could have used an alternative test or selec-
tion device with a lesser discriminatory impact.8" It is this step that has caused a
split of decisions9" regarding which party has the burden of proof; the Albemarle
Court did not clarify what burdens were carried by which party.9
The Albemarle Court also concentrated on establishing what was meant by the
term "job-relatedness." To interpret the defendant's rebuttable evidence, the Court
looked at EEOC guidelines' interpretation as the Griggs Court had so done in in-
82. Albemarle, 401 U.S. at 434. Plaintiffs were not "qualified" under the disparate treatment theory because
they did not meet the employer's job requirements. Id. at 426-28.
83. Id. at 430-32. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975).
84. In Griggs the plaintiff compared the 34% white males who had diplomas with the 12% black males who
had diplomas in the state. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
Plaintiffs also introduced an EEOC study which showed that when a similar test was administered at another
location, 58% whites passed and only 6% blacks passed. Id.
85. Id. at 43 1.
86. Id. Of course, disparate impact does not refer only to Negroes. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
87. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
88. Id. at 426-30.
89. Id. at 425, 436.
90. The Albemarle Court relied on standards set by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures of the EEOC, the Departments of Justice and Labor and the Civil Service Commission. See 29 C.F.R. §
1607 (1978).
The Court was urged to "adopt a single governing formulation" concerning business necessity and job-related-
ness in the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (No. 87-1387).
91. See Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice,
34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1208-09 (1981).
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terpreting the plaintiffs prima facie case.92 The Court remarked that these guide-
lines constituted the administrative interpretation of the enforcing agency and
were therefore "entitled to great deference."93 "[D]iscriminatory tests are imper-
missible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be 'predictive of
or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which com-
promise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evalu-
a te d .' ,,94
E Application of the Two Theories
As thus far illustrated, significant distinctions as well as theoretical underpin-
nings existed between disparate treatment and disparate impact. Many factual situ-
ations, however, permit the application of both theories.9' The most common
circumstance in which a plaintiff may wish to use both theories is when he or she
alleges class-wide discrimination resulting from a combination of employment
practices which includes some subjective, as well as objective, decision-making.
If the court refused to apply the disparate impact analysis in such a case, the em-
ployer might prevail; however, if the disparate impact theory is utilized, the em-
ployee might be the victor."9
Although the theory of disparate impact appears most commonly in class
actions, 7 it can also be used by individual plaintiffs, as it was in Connecticut v.
Teal. 98 As Teal held, individual plaintiffs are entitled to relief if they prove they are
the victims of discriminatory employment practices, regardless of the preferential
treatment of other members of the same group. But the disparate treatment theory
has remained the usual method of proving individual claims. Since it requires
proof of the employer's intent to discriminate 9 and, prior to Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust Co. at the Supreme Court level, objective employment criteria,1"'
disparate treatment has been a much more difficult theory for the plaintiff.
92. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 428-36; see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-36; see also supra note 82.
93. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431.
94. Id. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1974)).
However, Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, thought these guidelines should not be given such "great defer-
ence" because job-relatedness and validation tests were not supported by the language of Title VII. Albemarle,
422 U.S. at 451-53.
The fact that most employment tests were not scientifically valid had become widely known after the EEOC
had promulgated its second set of guidelines in 1970 which followed the consensus among psychological experts
that validity of most tests was difficult to establish. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).
95. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n. 15.
96. Prior to Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), the Supreme Court had remained
silent as to the application of the adverse impact model to subjective criteria. The circuit courts had become
evenly divided on the issue.
97. The disparate treatment case is individualized, making it more difficult to maintain a class action under it
than under the Griggs-type analysis. This is particularly true since General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147
(1982) narrowed the application of FED R. Civ. P. 23 in discrimination cases. See also Johnson, Rebuilding the
Barriers: The Trend in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 19 COLUM. HUM. Rs. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
98. 457 U.S. 440,442 n.2. (1982). See also Welch, Superficially Neutral Classifications: Extending Disparate
Impact Theory to Individuals, 63 N.C.L. REv. 849 (1985) (suggesting a new framework for applying the disparate
impact theory to individuals).
99. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15.
100. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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The initial prima facie showing in both the pattern and practice1"1 disparate
treatment case and the disparate impact case involves similar proof of disparity.
Both must show statistical evidence; in the latter, it is the only method of establish-
ing the requisite disparity although a lesser amount of disparity is required than in
the former.10 2 Insufficient statistical disparity or use of an improper statistical
method is a defense for employers in both pattern and practice disparate treatment
cases and disparate impact cases. 10 3 The significant differences between the two
theories have been the burden placed on the defendant in rebutting the plaintiffs
prima facie case and the application of objective and subjective criteria.
G. Criteria
1. Pre- Watson and -Atonio -Split Circuit Decisions
A defendant may support his case with different types of criteria such as scored
tests for intelligence, achievement, reading, writing, etc., or non-scored criteria
such as educational achievement, work experience, and license requirements.
Such criteria are objective criteria. 0 4 A defendant may also have relied on subjec-
tive criteria such as judgment of the applicant's ability to get along, his ability as a
team player, maturity, self-reliance, and leadership ability. Until recently the Su-
preme Court has given little guidance on how the lower courts should apply objec-
tive and subjective criteria to disparate impact analysis.
Prior to Atonio, the circuits agreed that the disparate impact theory may be
properly applied to discrimination based on objective criteria because these fall
within the parameter of the Griggs Court's "facially neutral practices." 05 The
lower courts disagreed, however, as to whether subjective criteria may be deemed
101. Pattern and practice cases are broadly construed by the Justice Department as meaning that the discrimi-
natory acts were something other than isolated, peculiar, or accidental events.
102. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1324 (2d ed. 1983) ("Unlike
the disparate treatment case, under the adverse impact theory 'proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not re-
quired.' The focus is thus on the consequences of the selection criteria or other practice. Since the focus is on
consequences, statistical evidence is paramount." (footnote omitted)).
103. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
104. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 80-8 1, 162-90 for a discussion of objective criteria.
105. Teal, 457 U.S. at 443; Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 427; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429 (all involving "general
intelligence or aptitude tests"); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977) (involving a height and
weight cutoff).
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facially neutral and therefore be applied to this theory."'0 The Supreme Court in
Griggs did not distinguish between objective and subjective impact analysis.
However, the language of the Uniform Guidelines apply to any selection proce-
dure used as a basis for making employment decisions, thereby appearing to apply
to both objective and subjective criteria."0 7 A court's refusal to apply the disparate
impact theory to subjective criteria eliminates this method of analysis for a large
category of jobs because the selection criteria for most supervisory and profes-
sional jobs are in part discretionary. Therefore, "[e]xclusion of such subjective
practices from the reach of the disparate impact model of analysis is likely to en-
courage employers to use subjective, rather than objective, selection criteria."108
2. The Atonio Decision in the Lower Federal Courts
The district court in Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co. 109 declined to apply the
disparate impact theory to the plaintiffs' allegations of employment discrimination
because the plaintiffs had alleged subjective criteria such as nepotism, word-of-
mouth recruitment, rehire policies, and lack of objective job qualifications. On
appeal a three-judge panel affirmed the district court's decision; however, the
court of appeals granted review en banc and reversed the district court holding. 10
After a consideration of legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit majority declared that
disparate impact analysis was applicable to subjective criteria.111 The court also
considered the statutory language of Title VII and stated that Title VII prohibits
106. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits had allowed such actions. Atonio v. Wards Cove
Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1478, 1480, 1489 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987); Regner v. City of Chicago, 789 F.2d 534,
537 (7th Cir. 1986); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1523-25 (1 th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,
1266 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical Con-
trol, 690 F.2d 88, 92 (6th Cir. 1982).
The Fourth Circuit had not allowed subjective criteria to be applied. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits were split in their decisions concerning the application of subjective cri-
teria. Compare Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 E2d 1038, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1984) and Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowing suit using subjective criteria) with Cunningham v.
Housing Auth. of City of Opelousas, 764 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1985) (barring suit using subjective criteria)
and Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 723 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th Cir. 1984).
Compare EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 218, 318 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing suit using subjective crite-
ria) with Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1983) (barring suit using subjective
criteria).
Compare Lasso v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984) (allowing suit us-
ing subjective criteria) with Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 824, 829 (10th Cir. 1982) (barring suit using sub-
jective criteria).
107. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(c) (1985).
108. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (1 1th Cir. 1985). The Griffin court held that disparate impact
analysis could be applied to the final results of the defendants' subjective, multi-component promotion process.
Id.
109. 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,437 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
110. Atonio, 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn, 787 F2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985), decided en banc,
810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
111. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482-83. The court cited H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 19, 24, reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 2137,2164; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 14-15 (1971);
118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7564 (1972).
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"all forms of employment discrimination . . . without reference to either objec-
tive or subjective practices." '112 The underlying rationale of the court's analysis
was that most, if not all, employment criteria must "necessarily have both subjec-
tive and objective elements." '113
3. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust on
the limited question of whether the disparate impact theory applies to subjective
criteria.114 The case involved a black woman who had unsuccessfully applied four
times for promotions to supervisory positions, each time losing out to a white em-
ployee. 15 The bank had relied on the discretion of its white supervisors to hire and
promote employees. 11 Holding that the plaintiff had not met her burden of proof
under the disparate treatment theory as set forth in McDonnell Douglas and Bur-
dine, the district court dismissed the case.117 On appeal the circuit court rejected
plaintiffs contention that the district court had erred in failing to apply the dispar-
ate impact analysis to her claim and held that a Title VII challenge to subjective
criteria could only be analyzed under the disparate treatment theory. 118
The Supreme Court held that, in principal, the disparate impact theory applies
as much to subjective criteria as it does to objective criteria. 19 The Court recog-
nized this extension as a necessary consequence of Griggs because "a facially neu-
tral practice, adopted without discriminatory intent, may have effects that are
indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices. " " ° The Court ac-
knowledged plaintiffs argument that if disparate impact "is confined to objective
tests employers will be able to substitute subjective criteria having substantially
identical effects, and Griggs will become a dead letter." 21 Had the Court stopped
with this conclusion, the future viability of Griggs would have been assured.
However, the Court, in a multi-faceted opinion of partial concurrences, exam-
ined the evidentiary standards in order to apply the disparate impact theory to sub-
jective criteria.
H. Evidentiary Guidelines
To establish a prima facie case under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff
need only demonstrate that "she applied for an available position for which she was
qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of
112. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982)).
113. 810 F.2d at 1485.
114.487 U.S. 977 (1988).
115. Id. at982.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 983-84.
118. Id. at 984.
119. Id. at 999.
120. Id. at 990.
121.Id. at 989.
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unlawful discrimination."'22 Once the plaintiff has done so, the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the defendant, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for rejecting the plaintiff."'2 If the defendant meets this burden of produc-
tion, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the defendant's reason was pre-
textual.' 24 So, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff
throughout the proceedings. 2 '
The plurality'26 in Watson merged the disparate impact analysis allocation of
proof with the disparate treatment analysis. They did not feel that the evidentiary
standards articulated in prior cases were suitable for the analysis using subjective
employment criteria and, therefore, suggested new evidentiary guidelines.127
These consisted of requiring the plaintiff to identify the specific practice being
challenged in order to make a prima facie case, requiring that the burden of proof
remain with the plaintiff at all times and not requiring the employer to demon-
strate, in rebuttal, that the challenged practice is necessary to job performance as
long as it is "normal and legitimate." 28 The Watson plurality, therefore, lessened
the burdens placed upon the defendant and increased the ones placed upon the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff s burdens are increased, first of all, by the demand that he identify
the specific challenged practice, show the statistical disparities, and prove causa-
tion to set out his prima facie case. 29 The plaintiff "must offer statistical evidence
of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a
protected group." 3 The Court acknowledged that it may be more difficult for the
plaintiff to isolate and identify the specific employment practice when dealing
with subjective criteria but emphasized that the plaintiff was responsible for car-
rying this burden.131 The Court imposed this additional burden in response to con-
cerns that employers would face an impossible task of rebutting a prima facie case
based on mere statistical evidence using the Griggs rebuttal of "business neces-
sity." 32 The Court feared that employers would be forced either to abandon their
122. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
123. Id.
124. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
125. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
126. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court. She was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Scalia in Parts II-C and 11-D of the opinion to produce the plurality opinion concerning the evidentiary
guidelines. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justices Stevens and Black-
mun, concurring in the judgment, wrote separate opinions regarding the evidentiary guidelines. Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun.
127. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993-99. Justice O'Connor stated: "[W]e do not believe that each verbal formulation
used in prior opinions to describe the evidentiary standards in disparate impact cases is automatically applicable
in light of today's decision." Id. at 994.
128. Id. at 991-99.
129. Id. at 994-95.
130. d. at 994.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 991-92.
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subjective selection practices or to establish numerical quotas to validate their sub-
jective practices."'
The second step in the disparate impact analysis, suggested by the Watson plu-
rality again increased the plaintiffs burdens while decreasing those of the defend-
ant. Although the Court recognized that the Griggs formulation provides that the
employer has the burden of showing a "business necessity" or "job-relatedness" as
his defense, the Court stated that "such a formulation should not be interpreted as
implying that the ultimate burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant."" 4 To
the contrary, the plurality stated that "the ultimate burden of proving that discrimi-
nation against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment prac-
tice remains with the plaintiff at all times."13 Thus, the defendant has only a
burden of production; the burden of persuasion never shifts from the plaintiff.
Once the defendant has met its burden of production, the plaintiff must show that
an alternative selection device existed." 6 The requisite showing for rebuttal -the
demonstration of 'job necessity" - is lowered; a defendant need only show that the
employment criteria is based on normal and legitimate business practices. This
standard is more reflective of the disparate treatment analysis than traditional dis-
parate impact analysis of Griggs, Teal, and Dothard v. Rawlinson. 137 This standard
lowers the evidentiary burden for employers so they can avoid a "mandatory
quota-based system. ""' The plurality explained its reasoning by stating: "[T]he
high standards of proof in disparate impact cases are sufficient in our view to avoid
giving employers incentives to modify any normal and legitimate practices by in-
troducing quotas or preferential treatment."139
Justices Stevens and Blackmun wrote separate opinions, each concurring in the
judgment, but disagreeing with these "fresh" evidentiary guidelines.14 ° Black-
mun's concurrence pointed out that the evidentiary standards suggested by the plu-
rality depart significantly from prior disparate impact analysis and instead
conform more with prior disparate treatment analysis.141 He stated that the new
standards, in fact, contradicted the allocations of burdens set forth by the Dothard
and Albemarle decisions since in these prior cases the defendant was given the bur-
den of persuasion, not mere production, in rebuttal. 142 He also stated that lessen-
ing the burden on the employer would "disserve Title VII's goal of eradicating
discrimination in employment." "
133. Id. See also Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 25
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63, 88 (1988).
134. Watson, 487 U.S. at 997.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 998 (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425).
137. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
138. However, the Griggs Court had rejected a similar argument. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434,436.
139. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999.
140. Id. at 994. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
141. Id. at 1001-02.
142. Id. at 1001.
143. Id. at 1009.
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Justice Stevens concurred with the judgment but stated that the imposition of
new evidentiary standards should be postponed until the district court reviewed
the case on remand. 1" He agreed with Justice Blackmun's articulation that these
new standards were not necessary to decide the issue before the Court on certio-
rari. 4 He did concur with the plurality's proposal that formal validation studies
should not be a necessity for an employer to justify subjective criteria.146 Watson
left the issue with a trifurcated view and no binding precedent for courts to follow
for applying evidentiary guidelines to subjective criteria. It also paved the way for
the appeal of Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.
IV. INSTANT CASE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio147 to
address the disputed questions concerning the application of Title VII's disparate
impact theory of liability which were left unanswered in the Watson decision."
The Court first considered whether or not the respondent had made out a prima
facie case of disparate impact.' 49 Reversing the court of appeals' ruling that a com-
parison between the percentage of cannery workers who are nonwhite and the per-
centage of noncannery workers who are nonwhite made out a case of disparate
impact, the Court remanded the case to the district court to resolve whether a
prima facie case was established on some basis other than racial disparity.' The
Court held that no prima facie case had been made upon the presentation of statis-
tical data which merely showed a high percentage of nonwhite workers in the can-
nery jobs and a low percentage of such workers in noncannery jobs because the
"proper comparison [must be] between the racial composition of [the at-issue
jobs] and the racial composition of the qualified ... population in the relevant
labor market." 5' The Court would also allow such measures indicating the racial
composition of "otherwise-qualified applicants" for at-issue jobs. 5 2 But the Court
ruled that respondents had not reflected "the pool of qualified job applicants" or
the "qualified population in the labor force" in their comparison and that the com-
parison offered was "nonsensical." 5 3 "If the absence of minorities holding such
skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons
that are not petitioners' fault), petitioners' selection methods or employment prac-
144. Id. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
145. Id. at 1000-01.
146.Id. at 1011.
147. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
148. Id. at 2121.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2123-24.
151. Id. at 2121 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)).
152. 109 S. Ct. at 2121 (citing New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585 (1979)). See also id.
n.6 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 329-30; Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20).
153. 109 S. Ct. at 2122.
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tices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on nonwhites." 5 4 The con-
verse theory, stated the Court, would mean that any employer who had a segment
of his work force racially imbalanced for any reason could be charged under Title
VII and forced to defend the "business necessity" of his employment practices. 5
The Court feared this would leave employers with no choice but to adopt racial
quotas and reiterated that such a practice was repugnant to the legislative intent of
Title VII. 
156
The Court went on to address two other challenges that petitioners had made to
the circuit court's decision. First, it addressed the "causation" question in a dispar-
ate impact case and extended the holding of Watson's plurality of placing a greater
burden on the plaintiff. Second, the Court addressed the "business justification"
rebuttal of the defendant and the "alternative selection device" surrebuttal availa-
ble to the plaintiff and again upheld the Watson plurality, announcing a lesser bur-
den for defendants and a greater burden for plaintiffs. 
157
In addressing the causation factor in plaintiffs prima facie case, the Court re-
peated Watson's holding that the plaintiff must isolate and identify the specific
challenged employment practice, especially in subjective criteria cases .158 The
Court compared the impropriety of an employer's demonstrating "bottom line" ra-
cial balance as a defense with a plaintiffs making out a prima facie case by show-
ing racial imbalance in the workforce "at the bottom line."159 Therefore, even on
remand, respondents would have to show that the disparity complained of is the
result of one of the challenged employment practices, "specifically showing that
each challenged practice" significantly impacts employment opportunities for
whites and nonwhites."1 0 The Court has, therefore, placed an additional burden on
a plaintiffs prima facie case.
In addressing the business justification factor, the Court agreed with the Watson
plurality holding that the employer carries only the burden of producing evidence
of a business justification and that the burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff. 61 The Court announced that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that the
burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant was an erroneous interpretation and
quoted Watson as its source that the burden remains with the plaintiff at all
times. 6 The Court's reasoning behind this interpretation was that such a ruling
conforms not only with the usual rules of evidence but also to the disparate treat-
154. Id. The Court did point out that "the analysis would be different if the dearth of qualified nonwhite appli-
cants was due to practices on petitioner's part which -expressly or implicitly-deterred minority group members
from applying for noncannery posititions." Id. at 2122 n.7.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 988 n.2 (plurality opinion); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 449).
157. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2124-27.
158. Id. at 2124.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2125.




ment rule.163 Although the Court acknowledged that earlier Supreme Court cases
could be read as suggesting this shift in the persuasion burden, it stated that such
interpretation was a misunderstanding of the Court's intent."6 4
In conclusion, the Court explained the Atonio decision in terms of Watson. Re-
spondents may still be able to prevail on remand, the Court stated, if they persuade
the factfinder that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate [hiring] interest[s]" or if
they demonstrate that the selection devices were just a "pretext" for discrimina-
tion. "6 A shift in burden would not occur because the plaintiff would always bear
the burden of persuasion. The Court continued to favor the defendant with its clos-
ing statement: "Courts are generally less competent than employers, to restructure
business practices; consequently, the judiciary should proceed with care before
mandating that an employer must adopt a plaintiffs alternative selection or hiring
practice in response to a Title VII suit."
166
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent.167 He felt the majority had turned a "blind
eye" to the very meaning and purpose of Title VII by rejecting "a longstanding rule
of law."16' He also considered the majority's opinion as underestimating the proba-
tive value of the respondent's statistical data presenting a racially stratified work
force.1 6' Because he perceived no urgency to decide the disputed evidentiary
standards at an interlocutory stage of the case, he stated that the Court should have
denied certiorari until the district court had made the additional findings directed
by the circuit court. 7
Stevens focused on the Griggs decision and the congressional intent behind Title
VII. He explained the development of Title VII jurisprudence because he thought
the majority's "facile treatment of settled law necessitate[d] such a primer. 171 Cit-
ing Justice Burger's landmark opinion in Griggs, Stevens explained the origin of
the disparate impact theory, expounding on the lawfulness of an exclusionary se-
lection method if it serves a valid business purpose. 72 He quoted the Griggs
Court: "Because Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em-
ployment practices, not simply the motivation[,] ...Congress has placed on the
employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question." 173 Stevens emphasized that Congress
has declined to limit the reach of the disparate impact theory and admonished the
163. Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 301; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-58).
164. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2127 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 568 (1978)).
167. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
168. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2127 n.3.
171. Id. at 2128.
172. Id. at 2128-29.
173. Id. at 2129 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
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majority for so doing;174 instead of limiting the application, Stevens pointed out
that Congress has extended the theory's use. 1715
In his historical narration, Stevens explained why the Griggs analysis was inap-
propriate for a claim of intentional discrimination and, therefore, why the theory
of disparate treatment was outlined differently in the cases of McDonnell Douglas,
Burdine, and Teamsters. 7 '
Since decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts have repeatedly
recognized the differences between the applications of the two theories, Stevens
argued that the majority has unnecessarily blurred that distinction. 77 He gave a
lesson on burdens of proof exemplified by Wigmore, Wright and Graham, the
Second Restatement of Torts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.178 These
sources explain, Stevens stated, that if the plaintiff proves the existence of his
prima facie case, the defendant can only escape liability by an affirmative defense,
after which the plaintiff is accorded a chance to refute the offered defenses. 179 In
Stevens' opinion, in the disparate impact case, as in the ordinary civil trial, "al-
though the burden of producing evidence shifts between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, the burden of proving either proposition remains throughout on the party
asserting it." 8 ' Stevens stated that the disparate treatment case is inapposite to the
disparate impact analysis because in a disparate treatment case there is no discrim-
ination without the employer's intent. '81 Stevens concluded from this that "the em-
ployee retains the burden of proving the existence of intent at all times."182
The Stevens' dissent contrasted the two theories and concluded that the employ-
er's business justification is an affirmative defenses and should therefore be a
"weighty" burden.184 Consequently, he expressed astonishment that the majority
should lessen the "touchstone" of business necessity set forth by the Griggs prog-
174. Id. at 2129.
175. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2128 n.9.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205.96 Stat. 131, 134, as amended, codified at 42
U.S.C. Sections 1973, 1973b (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Legislative reports leading to 1972 amendments
to Title VII also envice support for disparate impact analysis. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, pp. 8, 20-22
(1971); S.REP.No. 92-415, p.5, and n. 1 (1971); accord Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447, n.8,
102 S. Ct. 2525, 2531, n.8, 73 L. Ed.2d 130 (1982). Moreover, the theory is employed to enforce fair
housing and age discrimination statutes. See Note, Business Necessity in Title VII: Importing an Employ-
ment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORD. L. REv. 563 (1986); Note, Disparate
Impact Analysis and the Age of Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038 (1984).
Id.
176. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2129-30. See also supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
177. Id. at 2130-36.
178. Id. See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 2485-98 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981); 21 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5122 (1977); FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 8(c); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 328A, 433B, 454-61,463-67 (1965).
179. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2130-31.
180. Id. at 2131 (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. Id. See also n. 17 (quoting FED. R. Civ. PRO. 8(c) ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively ... any ... matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.")).
184. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2132.
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eny to a nonrequirement that the challenged practice even be "essential."' 85
Stevens expressed his belief that the Griggs opinion was a correct interpretation of
the legislative intent behind Title VII but stated that he would not reject the prece-
dent of consistent interpretation of the statute even if he were not so convinced.' 86
Also disturbed by the majority's redefinition of the plaintiffs prima facie bur-
dens, Stevens voiced his opinion that the additional requirement of isolation and
identification of a specific employment practice is unwarranted.'87 He agreed that
a causal link is a necessary element but noted that the specific act need not consti-
tute the sole cause of the discrimination. '88 He also maintained that a review of sta-
tistical evidence should not demand numerical exactitude in all cases. 89 He
admonished the Court for discounting the difficulty that the causation require-
ment will create for plaintiffs, especially in litigation such as the one at bar.' 90 In
Atonio the employers did not preserve their statistical personnel records because
they were not obligated to do so since "seasonal" jobs are exempt from certain re-
cord-keeping requirements.' 9 In Stevens' opinion the employer's statistical evi-
dence used for rebuttal was ineffectual due to its insufficiency respecting the
relevant labor market for noncannery jobs, and the respondent-employee's evi-
dence of racial stratification was, therefore, probative.' 92 He concluded by saying
that on remand the district court should consider the employee's evidence as "a
significant element of [his] prima facie case.' 93
Justice Blackmun wrote an additional dissent.' 94 Concurring with all of Stevens'
findings, Blackmun added his dissatisfaction with the majority's holding which he
deemed harsh and disabling to parties in these employees' positions. 9 5 He re-
sponded to the Court's holding as "essentially immuniz[ing]" the discriminatory
practices of the salmon industry, which he and Stevens believed resembles a "plan-
tation economy,"' 98 from attack under a Title VII disparate impact analysis.' 97
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court inAtonio sought to avoid the murky objective/subjective di-
chotomy by adopting the Watson plurality's extension of subjective criteria to the
disparate impact analysis. The Court imposed new evidentiary guidelines as a
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2132-36.
188. Id. at 2132-33.
189. Id. at 2133 (citingiNew York Transit Authority, 440 U.S. at 584-86; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-30; Albe-
mar&e, 422 U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426, 430 n.6).
190. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2133.
191. Id. at 2125 n.10; id. at 2133 n.20.
192. Id. at 2134-36. To reach his conclusion, Stevens coupled respondent's evidence that employees are re-
cruited for at-issue jobs from outside the workforce, that availability of these at-issue jobs is conducted by word
of mouth, that nepotistic hiring exists, and that separate housing and mess halls exist. Id. at 2135.
193. Id. at 2135-36.
194. Justice Blackmun was joined in his views by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
195. Id. at 2136.
196. Id.; see also id. at 2127 n.4.
197. Id. at 2136.
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result of the Watson Court's assumption that application of the Griggs standard to
subjective criteria would inevitably lead to quota-based hiring. 1 8 This assumption
is problematic and leads to an unnecessary rejection of precedent. In addition, the
new guidelines will apply not only to subjective employment criteria but to objec-
tive employment criteria as well. These unprecedented evidentiary guidelines are
inconsistent with the very purpose of Title VII.
A. The Fear of Quota-based Hiring
During the eighteen years since Griggs was decided, the principle behind dis-
parate impact has increasingly been extended to employment practices based on
subjective criteria, rather than on objective criteria such as diploma requirements
and scored achievement tests. '99 Prior to the Supreme Court precedent set by Wat-
son and Atonio, some employers had abandoned the use of objective criteria in fa-
vor of use of subjective criteria in order to avoid the disparate impact theory. Some
may have combined objective criteria results with subjective judgments, thereby
including minorities in jobs from which they would otherwise be excluded.2"'
Lower courts, previously lacking direction from the Supreme Court, have catego-
rized employment practices as either objective or subjective in deciding the appli-
cability of the disparate impact analysis.2"1 By allowing subjective criteria in the
impact theory, the Supreme Court has put a halt to intentional utilization of subjec-
tive criteria to avoid litigation and to continuation of discreet discrimination. As a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in Atonio, lower courts will no longer have
to decide if an employment practice should be deemed objective or subjective and
can focus on whether or not the impact is a consequence of a "facially neutral prac-
tice."202
Yet, the Atonio Court did not consider that the precedential evidentiary stand-
ards would protect employers against an adoption of racial quotas when applied to
disparate impact created by these practices. Instead, it feared the case would be
too difficult to defend. Citing Watson and Albemarle, the Atonio Court announced
that a quota system of employment selection is against Title VII's legislative in-
tent.203 However, in Griggs, the Court had already considered this very concern
and had explained how the very purpose of Title VII would not allow a quota sys-
tem to develop; it found that "Title VII expressly protects the employer's right to
insist that any prospective applicant [nonwhite] or white, must meet the applicable
198. Id. at 2122. "The only practicable option for many employers will be to adopt racial quotas, insuring that
no portion of his work force deviates in racial composition from the other portions thereof; this is a result that
Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VII." Id. (citing Watson, 109 S. Ct. at 2788).
199. See Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CH.-KENT L. Rav. 1,
17(1987).
200. Id. See also id. at 17 n.86 (citing Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607.6 (1986); Affirmative Action Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(c)(1) (1986) (recognizing this approach as
an alternative to validation)).
201. See supra note 104.
202. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32.
203. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2122. In fact, this had been one of the major fears of employers when Title VII was
first under consideration. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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job qualifications. Indeed, the very purpose of [T]itle VII is to promote hiring on
the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color."" 4 Despite
congressional assurances, an amendment was added to make certain that "job-re-
lated" tests would be permitted." 5 Therefore, if employers are honestly using
"job-related" tests, they need not be concerned about a quota system imposition. A
congressional mandate against a quota system is not inconsistent with Griggs to the
extent that the case and its progeny should be overruled. As one commentator has
suggested, the Griggs objective was to further "merit-based" hiring and promotion
through the development of a crucible which accurately demonstrated job per-
formance, not to promote a preferential quota system.2"6 Much of the disagree-
ment between the Justices in the Atonio decision over the new evidentiary
standards stems from an intrinsic conflict in their theories of Title VII.
Behind the majority's concern over quotas and preferential treatment is the as-
piration that Title VII is advancing employment on the basis of merit alone. This
theory... is reflected in the Court's extension of the disparate impact analysis to
subjective criteria. But since the Court views the employer as the best judge of
how to measure merit, it does not want employers to discard practices that the em-
ployer considers valid indicators of job performance. Evidentiary standards that
would cause the employer to choose practices that would favor minorities would
be in opposition to this merit principle. This would, of course, be against the con-
gressional mandate of Title VII.
The dissent, however, seems to base its aspiration of Title VII as extinguishing
discriminatory selection practices that came before its codification. Griggs sup-
ported this theory when the Court declared that "facially neutral practices" may
violate Title VII "if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."2' Therefore, the dissenters would uphold the legacy of
Griggs.
B. The Purposes of Evidentiary Burdens
The dissent also justifies its position through a reflection on common-law
pleading principles. Two distinct interpretations of the term "burden of proof "20 9
exist: a burden of production and a burden of persuasion.210 In discussions of dis-
parate impact, early Supreme Court decisions, such as Dothard and Albemarle, did
not clarify which burden was allocated when they discussed disparate impact.211
The burden of production begins with the plaintiff bringing the case; to bring a
204. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 7247 (1964)).
205. The amendment is codified at 110 CONG. REc. 13492 (1964). See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 n. 12.
206. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 945, 991 (1982). For a
discussion of the merit principle in antidiscrimination law, see Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U.
C. L. REv. 235 (1971).
207. See Fiss, supra note 206.
208. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
209. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131-32.
210. C. McCoRMICK, EvIDENCE § 336, at 947 (3d ed. 1984).
211. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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prima facie case, the plaintiff must produce evidence to support his pleading.212
The evidence must be sufficient to overcome a directed verdict in favor of the de-
fendant.213 A prima facie case may be interpreted as sufficient evidence to shift the
burden of production.2" 4 As Justice Stevens pointed out: "In the ordinary civil
trial, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
has harmed her."215 Once the plaintiff has been discharged of this initial task, the
burden of production shifts to the adverse party.216 The defendant can then con-
front the plaintiff's evidence as insufficient or erroneous. But if the plaintiff proves
the existence of the alleged wrong, the defendant must use an affirmative defense
and persuade the factfinder that his practice was justified or excusable.21 7 There-
fore, the party pleading the existence of a fact initially bears the burdens of both
production and persuasion,218 but if the defendant initiates an affirmative defense,
thereby remitting his own facts, he has assumed not only the burden of producing
those facts, but of persuading the factfinder that they are true.29
In general, he who seeks to move a court in his favor, whether as an original
plaintiff whose facts are merely denied, or as a defendant, who, in admitting his ad-
versary's contention and setting up an affirmative defense . . . must satisfy the
court of the truth and adequacy of . . . his claim.22
The burden of production may shift from party to party, but the burden of persua-
sion remains with the party asserting the fact.221
In a traditional disparate impact case, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
production and persuasion that an employment practice has had a significant, ad-
verse effect on an identifiable class. If he does furnish proof of disparate impact,
the defendant's justification becomes an affirmative defense. He should then as-
sume both the burden of production of evidence to justify the practice and also the
burden of persuasion to defend the practice.
The majority has relieved the defendant of this burden of persuasion even
though he is clearly promoting an affirmative defense. Such a holding goes against
212. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 210, § 338, at 952-53.
213. Id. at 953.
214. Id. at 965 n.4.
215. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A, 433B (1965)).
216. C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 210, § 336, at 947.
217. Id. See Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE 335-89 (1898) (quoting Caldwell v. New Jersey S.B. Co., 47 N.Y. 282, 290 (1872)) (" 'The bur-
den of maintaining the affirmative of the issue, and, properly speaking, the burden of proof, remained upon the
plaintiff throughout the trial; but the burden of necessity was cast upon the defendant, to relieve itself from the
presumption of negligence raised by the plaintiffs evidence.' ") J. THAYER, supra, at 357.
218. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 210, § 337, at 951 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
219. See Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 n. 17. Justice Stevens cites FED. R. Civ. PRoC. 8(c) and J. THAYER, A PRE-
LIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 368-69 to support such an analysis. He quotes Thayer as saying:
An admission may, of course, end the controversy; but such an admission may be, and yet not end it; and
if that be so, it is because the party making the admission sets up something that avoids the apparent effect
of it .... When this happens, the party defending becomes, in so far, the actor or plaintiff ....
J. THAYER, supra note 217, at 368-69.
220. J. THAYER, supra note 217, at 369.
221. See Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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common-law pleading and allocations of proof. The Court blurs the distinction be-
tween disparate treatment and disparate impact, but a significant difference in the
pleadings requisite for each should exist. In a disparate treatment case, the plain-
tiff must produce and persuade the existence of intent. This is not a part of the dis-
parate impact case. Since the initial assertion of facts to prove intent is with the
plaintiff, he never relinquishes the burden of persuasion that intent existed. The
defendant may follow the McDonnell/Burdine formula to refute the evidence, but
this would not be an assumption of the burden of persuasion.222 With respect to the
employer's response, the Court has diluted the evidentiary standards created by
the Court in prior cases of disparate impact.
C. Statistical Proof of Disparity - the Plaintiffs Burden
A substantial issue in a disparate impact case has always been whether the
plaintiff can establish that selection criteria had an adverse impact on the protected
class. This proof has traditionally been accomplished by statistically comparing
the protected class with the majority class. For example, the Griggs Court deter-
mined from statistical evidence that 58 % of white applicants and 6 % of black ap-
plicants had passed the prescribed intelligence tests.3 Based upon this data, a
prima facie case was established.224
This burden placed upon the plaintiff to produce statistical data has never been
a trivial burden. Relevant geographical area, time periods, statistical disparity,
and statistical sample size have all played a part in developing evidence that could
show a significant disparity.22 A plaintiff could not merely depend upon general
population data because "when special qualifications are required to fill particular
jobs, comparisons to the general population . . . may have little probative
value."226 Therefore, the disparate impact plaintiff needs statistics that reflect the
protected persons in the labor market. But because all qualified people for a given
job may not be interested in that job, figures may be exaggerated and a defendant
could be successful in demanding ameliorated statistics .227 A plaintiff must ac-
quire actual or qualified flow data to put together his offense. He must assimilate
work force data, and this data may be unreliable if the employer has historically
unlawfully discriminated .228 The plaintiff will have difficulty in statistically prov-
ing disparate impact if there are few protected class members within the relevant
222. Id.
223. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
224. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 321 (other selection criteria can also determine an adverse effect, such as height
and weight requirements).
225. For an excellent discussion of these criteria, see Corbett, Proving and Defending Employment Discrimina-
tion Claims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 217, 240-47 (1986).
226. Hazelwood, 422 U.S. at 308 n. 13.
227. Corbett, supra note 225.
228. Id. at 241-42.
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geographical area.229 The plaintiff will have to meet the statute of limitations for
his statistical comparisons.230
Thus, before the Atonio Court's added burdens, the plaintiff already had nu-
merous obstacles to overcome in merely producing statistical evidence. Even if the
plaintiff demonstrates a statistical disparity using the appropriate comparisons,
the relevant geographical area, and within the correct time period, he still must
establish that his data is significant. Courts have recognized a number of tests for
determining this significance, 23" ' and the plaintiff must pass the utilized test to
meet his prima facie case. "Gross" disparity2 32 may be found without statistical
tests, but in recent years courts have required more sophisticated statistical meth-
ods and statistical significance.233
Even in cases where the plaintiff can acquire data from the employer, assimilat-
ing the data into significant statistical form is quite burdensome. But in cases such
as Atonio, where the employer did not even preserve such data, the burden is over-
whelming. It is, in fact, almost impossible. The Atonio Court played down this dif-
ficulty, stating that plaintiffs can use the "liberal discovery rules" to obtain
statistical personnel records from the employer. 234 But this is not possible if such
records are non-existent. Even when such records exist, flow data and work force
data may be unreliable. As Justice Stevens aptly stated, the "additional proof re-
quirement is unwarranted.9
235
Courts have always required a causation factor to establish that a defendant is
liable 23" but have not required that the challenged act be the "sole or primary"
cause. 237 Since the alleged "act" may be a cumulation of numerous employment
practices, a plaintiff should not be required to isolate and identify238 the specific
employment practices responsible for the disparity and then produce significant
statistical evidence to justify causation.
229. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 299 (The Court found that the greater the number of protected class people
within the geographic area, the easier it is to prove adverse impact.).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 706(e) (A charge must be filed with EEOC within 60 days of the alleged discriminatory
action absent a state statute to the contrary.).
231. One test was set out by Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 430-31, 437, and Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656
F.2d 1267, 1273 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (finding that a 0.05 level of statistical
significance establishes a prima facie case, meaning a 95 % assurance that discrimination was the cause of the
disparity). Another test applied was set out by Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309-11 and nn. 14 and 17 (using a two to
three standard deviations test). The EEOC has suggested a "rule of thumb" test, in which plaintiff must show that
the selection rate for the protected class is less than four-fifths or 80%. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d) (1981).
For a discussion on the application of these tests to determine relevant statistical disparity, see Corbett, supra
note 225, at 245-46.
232. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330 n.12; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
233. Corbett, supra note 225, at 247.
234. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
235. Id. at 2132.
236. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrS § 430 (1965).
237. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2132; 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 431-433 (1965). Cf Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
238. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2124 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994).
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D. The Defendant's New Burden of "Proving"
Prior to Atonio, disparate impact analysis has differed from disparate treatment
analysis because of the defendant's burden of proving "business necessity"239 or
"job-related[ness] ."240 Proving this business necessity has generally required the
employer to justify the use of the challenged criteria as "necessary to safe and effi-
cientjob performance" '241 or to exhibit a significant correlation between the impor-
tant elements of job performance and the criteria in question.242 The Atonio
discussion of evidentiary standards in disparate impact analysis borrows important
disparate treatment language in a way which calls into question the ability of dis-
parate impact to remain disassociated from discriminatory intent.
Prior to Watson and Atonio, the Court had contrasted the two doctrines. In Do-
thard v. Rawlinson" the Court noted that a claim of discrimination against women
resulting from the employer's use of a height and weight requirement need not as-
sert any discriminatory motive. In Connecticut v. Teal. the Court held that a writ-
ten test could constitute discrimination against blacks even though the state had
used an affirmative action program in the selection process to offset the effects of
the test. The Atonio Court now de-emphasizes the distinctions between disparate
treatment and disparate impact.
The Court's reiteration of the Watson statement that the "ultimate burden of
proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a spe-
cific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times"24 resembles a
disparate treatment analysis more than in any prior disparate impact case. It is
reminiscent of the language in Burdine and McDonnell Douglas which, in charac-
terizing the employer's burden as one of "production," required the employer to
articulate "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for rejecting the plaintiff.2"6
Although such a retreat from distinguishing the two theories may shorten the
reach of disparate impact, disparate impact had overcome disparate treatment's
more limited reach. As Justice Blackmun stated in Watson, prior cases suggested
that, whereas statistical proof of minority underachievement in disparate treat-
ment analysis created no more than an inference of an employer's discriminatory
intent, statistical proof in disparate impact cases directly established that the em-
ployer's practices produced effects forbidden by Title VI.24 Therefore, the blur-
ring of the two theories implicitly undermines the view that Title VII prohibits any
selection devices affecting groups differently unless such a difference can bejusti-
fied in such a way as to merit difference among applicants, regardless of intent or
239. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
240. Id. at 436.
241. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n. 14.
242. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431.
243. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
244. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
245. Atonio, 109 at 2126 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 997).
246. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
247. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 1003-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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nonintent on the employer's part.2"8 An unjustified disparate impact is forbidden
by Title VII; disparate treatment creates an inference of discrimination. To rebut a
forbidden practice should require an affirmative defense and a shift in the burden
of persuasion; to rebut an inference should only require meeting the burden of pro-
duction. The new evidentiary guidelines are inconsistent with the purpose of Title
VII.
E. Upholding the Purpose of Title VII
The legislative endorsement of Griggs in the 1972 amendments to Title VII
proved that Congress intended to eradicate discriminatory impact in hiring and
promotion.24 9 "Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the prob-
lem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs. "250
The Atonio Court followed the Watson rationale that forcing employers to validate
subjective criteria would place an impossible burden upon them. Even if subjec-
tive criteria are difficult to validate, such difficulty would not lessen an employer's
burden of proof under the historical impact theory. As Griggs exemplified, validat-
ing objective criteria is also difficult. However, Griggs emphasized that the intent
behind Title VII was expressly to protect an employer's right to insist that employ-
ees meet qualifications if those qualifications "measure the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract."251
In Watson the American Psychological Association submitted an amicus brief to
show that subjective criteria can be validated in ways similar to those used for vali-
dating objective criteria.2 2 Other methods of validation, such as nationwide stud-
ies, expert testimony, or prior success of such criteria, could be used.25 3
Continuing to require validation of criteria would force employers to revise ques-
tionable criteria and further the goal of Title VII.
These new guidelines were not necessary to relieve employers of any difficulty
in rebutting subjective criteria and are even more unnecessary when applied to ob-
jective criteria. The Atonio Court, however, extended these new guidelines to
both.
248. See Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 17,
22 ("The 'baby' in Griggs is the principle that unjustified discriminatory impact is unlawful, even in the absence of
disparate treatment and/or discriminatory intent.").
249. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 n.1 (1971); H.R. REP.No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1971). See also Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8.
250. Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8. (quoting S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971)).
251. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
252. Watson, 487 U.S. 1007 n.5.
253. Id. at 1007.
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F Case Law Subsequent to Atonio
Since the Atonio decision, several federal courts have applied their interpreta-
tion of Atonio in ruling on disparate impact cases.254 Certiorari has been granted by
the Supreme Court on cases for further consideration in light of Atonio.25 The
courts are still differentiating between disparate treatment and disparate impact,25 6
although some disparate treatment cases are quoting the Atonio decision unneces-
sarily.
257
The Second Circuit used the Atonio and Watson standards to rule that statistical
evidence concerning a hiring practice as a whole did not meet the now-required
prima facie burden of isolating and identifying the specific employment prac-
tice .258 The Fourth Circuit has also found for the employer when plaintiffs failed to
prove a prima facie case under Atonio standards259 and when the employer showed
some valid employment goal from his practice. 26" The Sixth Circuit has ruled for
the employer when the plaintiff did set out a prima facie case because the employer
"satisfied the burden of showing the employment practices in this case were based
upon a legitimate business reason."26' The Seventh Circuit has used the more leni-
ent "business justification" defense versus the prior "business necessity" defense to
vacate and remand cases to the district court in favor of the defendant even though
plaintiffs had shown prima facie cases.262 There is no doubt that the Atonio deci-
sion has changed the outcome of disparate impact cases.
G. Legislation Subsequent to Atonio
Members of Congress have recognized the need to overrule theAtonio decision.
The Fair Employment Reinstatement Act 263 was introduced as a bill on June 23,
254. A non-exhaustive list includes: Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir.
1989); International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 887 (7th Cir. 1989); International
Union, UAW v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 770 n.5 (6th Cir. 1989); Williams v. Giant Eagle Markets, Inc.,
883 F.2d 1184, 1192 (3d Cir. 1989); Rendon v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 390 n. 1(5th Cir. 1989);
Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 1989); Evans v. City of Evanston, 881
F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989); Allen v. Seidmon, 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co.,
881 F.2d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
255. USX Corp. v. G. Green, 109 S. Ct. 3151 (1989); Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Flor-
ida, 109 S. Ct. 3151 (1989).
256. For example, see Rendon v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d at 390 n. I ("[Tihis is a disparate treatment
case, not affected by the Wards Cove decision. .. ").
257. Williams v. Giant Eagle Mkts., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1192 (recognizing that changes have been evidenced in
Title VII cases but quoting Atonio to support the finding that "no shadow has been cast on the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine allocation of burdens- in disparate treatment); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d
at 313 (unnecessarily citing Atonio to delegate burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases); Rendon v. AT&T
Technologies, 883 F.2d at 390 n. 1. ("Although the district court used some language from disparate impact
cases, the record in its entirety demonstrates that the parties tried this case as a disparate treatment action and the
parties on appeal briefed this case according to the relevant disparate treatment precedents.").
258. Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989).
259. Mallory, 882 F.2d at 912.
260. Id.
261. International Union, UA W, 886 F.2d at 770 (citingAtonio for the proposition that defendants have the bur-
den of producing evidence of a business justification, but plaintiffs still have the burden of proof).
262. Evans v. City of Evanston, 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989); Allen v. Seidmon, 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
263. S. 1261, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).
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1989." Under this act, an employer would be required to prove a business justifi-
cation for an allegedly discriminatory employment practice in a disparate impact
case. The employer would also have to show that the employment practice resulted
in the disparate impact. This act would return disparate impact analysis to the
Griggs approach of the employer's showing "business necessity" which has been
followed in "hundreds of lower court decisions."265
In remarks on the Senate floor, Senator Metzenbaum, who introduced the bill,
asked, "How can we expect a plaintiff-an individual employee or job applicant -
to be able to prove there is no business justification for a particular practice?" 6 ' He
also stated: "It is the employer, not the individual worker, who knows why the
practice was adopted. In addition, anyone who has ever been in a courtroom
knows that it is virtually impossible for a party to prove the negative."267 A number
of civil rights groups have expressed support for the bill, including the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the National Women's Law Center.268
Comprehensive legislation in the form of an omnibus civil rights reform bill
was also introduced in Congress in 1990 to amend Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.26 A companion Senate bill was introduced by the Labor and Human
Resources Committee Chairman, Edward Kennedy.27 This bill addressed the Su-
preme Court ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio as well as other employ-
ment decisions handed down by the Court in 1989.271 Section 4 of the proposed
bill would have added to section 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act a subsection
which would make unlawful an employment practice that results in a disparate im-
pact on a protected group if the respondent cannot meet both the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion and thereby prove that the practice is required by business
necessity. The bill did not address the heightened statistical standards adopted in
Atonio, however.272
Although he claimed to deeply regret doing so, President Bush vetoed the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 on October 22, 1990.273 Congress was unable to override the
264. Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum from Ohio introduced the bill. Other original co-sponsors include Sens.
James A. Jeffords (Vermont), Brock Adams (Washington), Christopher J. Dodd (Connecticut), Albert Gore, Jr.
(Tennessee), Mark 0. Hatfield (Oregon), Edward M. Kennedy (Massachusetts), Frank R. Lautenberg (New Jer-
sey), Spark M. Matsunaga (Hawaii), Barbara A. Mikulski (Maryland), Claiborne Pell (Rhode Island), and Paul
Simon (Illinois).
265. Metzenbaum Seeks Reversal of Wards Cove, 131 LAB. REL. REP. 309 (1989).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 310.
269. See Civil Rights Reform Bill Introduced, 133 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 177 (1990).
270. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 was introduced in both houses of Congress on February 7, 1990,
as H.R. 4000 and S. 2104.
271. The bill is a comprehensive piece of legislation that goes far beyond addressing Wards Cove Packing v.
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), Patterson v. McLean Credit, 109 S.
Ct. 2363 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). See Civil Rights Reform Bill Introduced, 133 LAB. Ra.. REP. (BNA) 177-78 (1990).




veto despite wide support for the measure to do so.27 Although the President fa-
vored several of the bill's provisions, his main objection to the legislation was its
treatment of disparate impact litigation because of his belief that it would make it
difficult for employers to defend against legitimate job practices.27 He felt that
employers "would be driven to adopt quotas in order to avoid liability"2 76 and that
"S. 2104 engages in a sweeping rewrite of two decades of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. "277
Senator Kennedy responded to President Bush's quota argument by saying that
it was "a transparent smokescreen for the Administration's anticivil rights posi-
tion"278 and insisted that the bill was merely seeking to restore the Griggs rule of
law. 179 As Kennedy pointed out, the rule of Griggs was the law from 1971 to 1989
and throughout those eighteen years there is no evidence that employers felt
obliged to resort to quotas.2'
When the first session of Congress convened on Thursday, January 3, 1991, the
first bill to be introduced was the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 281 The legislation con-
tains essentially the same language as the Civil Rights Act of 1990, although addi-
tional language was placed in the bill to alleviate fear that it would cause employers
to impose the workplace quotas that President Bush believed would result.282 The
Bush administration is expected to package its civil rights legislation in the spring
of 199123 but it seems unlikely this new bill will be included.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio2. 4 modified
the ground rules that most lower courts had been following in disparate impact
cases. Prior to Atonio, courts usually followed a pattern which provided that, if a
Title VII plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate impact through show-
ing by a reasonable statistical test that employment practices used for hiring or
promotion were disproportionately excluding members of a protected group, the
burden of proof shifted to the employer defendant to persuade that the practice was
274. President Bush's veto was sustained by a 66-34 vote taken in the Senate on October 24; no override vote
was taken by the House. See Civil Rights Act of 1990 Is Defeated, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 343, at 1 (Nov. 5,
1990).
275. See Civil Rights Act of 1990 Is Defeated, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 343, at 1 (Nov. 5, 1990).
276. Id. President Bush stated, "Among other things, the Plaintiff often need not even show that any of the
employer's practices caused a significant statistical disparity. In other cases, the employer's defense is confined
to an unduly narrow definition of'business necessity that is significantly more restrictive than that established by




280. Id. See also supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fear of quota-based hiring.
281. H. R. 1.
282. The 1991 bill specifically states that it shall not be construed to "require or encourage" the adoption of
quotas. See Civil Rights Bill Is Back Before Congress, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 359, at 1 (January 22, 1991).
283. See While Administration Prepares Civil Rights Package, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 366, at 2 (Feb. 18,
1991).
284. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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a business necessity. Atonio changed this burden of persuasion and returned it to
the plaintiff, hence leaving only the burden of production on the employer. Atonio
also diluted the "necessity" in the "business necessity" defense to a degree that re-
quires the practice merely to serve the legitimate goals of the employer; the "busi-
ness necessity" no longer requires a showing of necessity and is no longer an
affirmative defense. If the plaintiff can propose an alternative selection device,
Atonio dictates that courts should proceed with care before mandating that an em-
ployer adopt such a device, thereby empowering the employer even further.
By so protecting the employer, the Atonio Court has undermined the purpose of
Title VII-that of protecting the employee. Atonio may have rendered Title VII
powerless to protect employees who have suffered due to an employer's use of sub-
jective selection criteria which can now be defended by a mere legitimate business
reason. Practices based on principles of racial stratification and segregation are
"essentially iimunize[d]"285 from attack under a disparate impact analysis. This
writer must agree with Justice Blackmun's concern that the majority in Atonio has
forgotten that race discrimination against non-whites is now, or even that it once
was, a problem in our society. 286 To deny this problem is to deny the very facts of
the Atonio case. This decision has given Title VII plaintiffs major steps backward
in their fight against discrimination. Congressional endorsement of Griggs and its
progeny had led courts to apply a fairly consistent interpretation of disparate im-
pact analysis, and it is unwarranted that the Supreme Court should nonchalantly
state that those cases have consistently misinterpreted the employer's burden of
proof. If the legislative intent of Title VII truly is to prevent discrimination, Con-
gress must convince President Bush of the need to pass the proposed legislation to
overrule Atonio and return disparate impact to its previous analysis.
Shirley Terry Kennedy
285. Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
286. Id.
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